The Anatomy of Guardianship: How Gerald Dworkin Broke Paternalism into Types
A classification of paternalism: hard and soft, broad and narrow, pure and impure, and the conditions under which intervention for another's good ceases to be coercion.
Modern philosophy has shifted the dispute from the question "is paternalism permissible at all?" to the question "when is it permissible and in what form?" The key to this transition is Gerald Dworkin's classification.
Two conditions
Dworkin defines a paternalistic act through two conditions: it restricts a person's freedom or autonomy, and it is done precisely because the agent believes this will improve that person's well-being (SEP: Paternalism). Already in his 1972 essay he described paternalism as interference justified by considerations relating exclusively to the good of the very person being coerced.
Hard and soft
Soft paternalism intervenes only in nonvoluntary, uninformed behavior; hard paternalism allows intervention even in a fully voluntary choice for the person's good. It is precisely the legitimacy of hard paternalism over an adult's informed choice that is the main nerve of the dispute.
The axes of classification
Dworkin adds further distinctions: broad/narrow (any agents or only the state), pure/impure (whether the protected and the restricted persons coincide), moral/welfare (whether we care about moral or physical good). This grid makes it possible to name precisely which kind of paternalism is at issue.
The burden of proof
Dworkin's conditions of justification are strict: a heavy burden of proof lies on the intervening party, and the means must be the least restrictive available. Intervention is not the norm but an exception that must be justified.
From Mill to Feinberg
Soft paternalism is compatible with Mill's harm principle, so the real front of the dispute is hard paternalism. Dworkin shows that the question is not about slogans "for" or "against" but about a careful analysis of the type of intervention.
Nudging: paternalism without coercion?
The modern turn is "libertarian paternalism" and the nudge: can one influence a choice without restricting options, and is this paternalism at all in Dworkin's sense? Dworkin's classification remains the instrument with which this new dispute is dissected.
Excerpts and dates
- 01к разделу «Два условия»
Рабочее определение патернализма
«Paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.»
Перевод: патернализм — это вмешательство государства или отдельного лица в дела другого человека против его воли, оправданное тем, что этому человеку станет лучше или он будет защищён от вреда.